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THE MUTINY AND THE MERCHANTS 
TIRTHANKAR ROY 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
ABSTRACT: The historiography of the Indian mutiny (1857-8) suggests that livelihood 
classes responded to the episode differently, but pays more attention to the agricultural 
classes than the urban commercial ones in studying the response. This essay revises the 
economic history of the rebellion by showing that commercial interests were influenced by 
concerns over security of property, and that they, as much as landed interests, shaped the 
course of the rebellion. 
 
 
‘All classes of people in India’, the historian R.C. Majumdar wrote in 1957, ‘were thoroughly 
discontented and disaffected against the British’ just before the outbreak of the sipahi mutiny 
in May 1857.1 Subsequent scholarship on this subject has confirmed that the mutiny turned 
into a civil rebellion in north India, but revealed also that different groups of people 
responded differently to the mutiny.2 When exploring these differences, historians have 
studied the countryside mainly. The loyalty of the landlord is a much discussed subject. So is 
the notion that some of the soldiers shared beliefs and attitudes with sections of the 
peasantry.3 In this evolving narrative of the society at large, the urban merchants and bankers, 
‘capitalists’ for short, remain shadowy if not missing altogether.4 For example, the words 
‘merchant’, ‘banker’, ‘trade’, or ‘market’ do not appear either as index entries or as 
significant topics in a selection of major works, old and new, on the subject.5 In recent 
writings on Delhi under rebel administration, the banker has received some attention, only 
tangentially in discussions of court politics and city administration.6 The ‘moneylender’ 
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receives attention too, but almost always as a part of the peasant world. The oversight 
obscures an important aspect of the history, which connects directly to the economics of 
warfare and state formation, and indirectly to the study of Indian society in this time. 
There are two open ends. First, there was an undercurrent of capitalist resistance to 
the rebel military enterprise within the rebel-held territories and an expression of support to 
the British Indian army outside this zone, but why these patterns arose is unexplained. 
Second, the nature of capitalist contribution to the war is not fully analysed. As in any war, 
supply of materiel and finance was of great importance to the armies. Business interests could 
either help the campaign by maintaining supplies, or damage it by blocking them. The mutiny 
disrupted grain trade and the financing of trade over a large area between May and September 
1857. Provisioning of the ‘field armies’, therefore, was a challenge for both parties.  The 
rebels who held key cities needed to build partnerships with the city merchants and bankers. 
The British needed the Indian merchants even more, because the expatriate merchants in the 
Gangetic plains were either dead or under siege. The historical scholarship provides some 
snapshots on how the enterprise of building a partnership developed, but does not offer useful 
generalizations on the process. 
In an attempt to bridge the gap, this essay asks four questions. Did merchants take 
sides? Why did they do so? Did the actions matter to the outcome of the war? How did they 
matter? Based on a study of the evidence now available, merchants did take political 
decisions, often taking unusual risks in the process, especially in the zones of conflict. The 
essay further suggests that these decisions need to be understood as a reaction to the 
insecurity of private property. Their response did contribute to the outcome of the war. In the 
material discussed here, we cannot make a direct correlation between specific battles and 
capitalist agency therein. There is, however, a case to be made that merchant disaffection and 
passive resistance were present in the rebel-held areas, and that merchants and bankers were a 
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party to the British war effort, which focused on keeping long-distance trade routes open, 
safe, and well supplied. 
In turn, these hypotheses link the mutiny with a global economic history of warfare.7 
The global history suggests that large conflicts interact with economic systems, to a degree 
that the outcome depends on economic and financial management more than strategy or 
gallantry in the battlefield. For example, during a war, states need to divert resources away 
from civil to military uses, and raise more resources. The fiscal mission, and at times the 
regulation of labour and capital markets that becomes necessary in its wake, can be stressful 
for private enterprise. Therefore, credible promises exchanged between states and merchants 
are crucial. Long conflicts like the world wars also made the conduct of monetary policy 
matter to whether or not fiscal gains were sustainable or to be drowned in macroeconomic 
collapse. Mancur Olson saw in wars the possibility of dramatic changes in the distribution of 
power in society.8 Businesses that serve the state during periods of crisis can gain if the state 
wins the war, or lose if the state loses. In turn these outcomes contribute to the speed and 
nature of the reconstruction process. Finally, because societies in sudden and deep crisis face 
an alteration in the comparative political advantage enjoyed by different groups, crises give 
rise to a variety of rent-seeking opportunities. The ‘grabbing hand’ is activated during the 
sudden withdrawal or collapse of the state. 
Some of these ideas are useful in interpretations of why the mutiny ended. ‘British 
victory’, in an influential view, ‘partly resulted from the failure of the Bombay and Madras 
armies to follow the lead of the north Indian sepoys.’9 This essay suggests that the outcome 
also had to do with the pattern of dependence that developed between the rulers and private 
enterprise in north India. For example, the conflict created local shortages of resources, which 
were met on the British side by indigenous merchants and bankers. It threw war finance and 
war supplies of the rebels out of gear; the numbers who rebelled were large and tended to 
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congregate in cities, whereas the resources of these cities to pay them did not grow. The 
subsequent attempts to regulate finances and markets caused enmity between the rebels and 
the merchant-bankers, whereas a revival of markets in regions outside but feeding into the 
war-zone helped the opposition. 
The sources for this essay are conventional ones. But the descriptions on business 
contained therein have not yet been closely read or used. The essay relies mainly upon 
printed official documents. A substantial part of the official documents are available in digital 
versions of the Parliamentary Papers. Some compilations of printed documents were also 
published around 1900, and are available as digital books.10 These volumes contain reports 
on the state of their jurisdiction sent to the Governor Generals’ office by officers of civil 
administration, such as Collectors, Magistrates, Engineers, Commissioners where applicable, 
and Secretaries to the provincial administration; correspondence of Military, Railway, Home, 
and Political departments; and reports of battles and occupied cities contributed by military 
officers.11 Contemporary accounts, such as John Kaye’s work extended by G.B. Malleson, 
used mainly these sources but a subset of what is now available, supplementing these with 
memoirs and eyewitness accounts.12 This corpus runs into several thousand printed pages, but 
actual material relevant to this paper is thinly scattered through these pages. I supplement 
these materials further with a few obscure printed sources such as biographical dictionaries. 
Source material on the business history of India is always hard to find. Biographical 
compilations often contain valuable data on firms of merchant-bankers that are not available 
elsewhere. We would wish to know more about these firms, but the resource is nowhere near 
as detailed as one would hope for. 
Non-official English-language documents such as memoirs of former soldiers and 
contemporary accounts form a larger body of material. These are mainly descriptions of 
battles, sometimes written by those who took part in action, and sometimes, as with George 
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Forrest, by archivists.13 Despite Malleson being a former officer of the commissariat 
department, these works contain much less information than we hope to find on trade, 
markets, supplies, and transport. Further, intended as ‘tributes to the glory of our arms’, 
military memoirs were often reserved on Indian role in the British war effort.14 This oversight 
meant not only that the gallantry of the Indian soldiers fighting on the British side received 
less attention than was fair but also that the job of feeding, clothing, and servicing the armies, 
primarily done with indigenous resources, was underestimated. This corpus is still helpful in 
cross-checking with the official documents the course of specific events. 
Indian-language sources form an area where exciting new finds have been made in the 
last few years. These resources include folklore, newspapers, private accounts, and pamphlets 
and proclamations issued by the rebel governments.15 However, these works, or what have 
been found, translated and published so far, are slight on the economic aspects in general and 
the merchants and bankers in particular. The translation project has shed more light on 
cultural history but has not yet shown much promise of a substantially greater knowledge of 
economic, business, or military history than it is possible to gather from military intelligence 
on the Company’s side. 
There is one major exception to this statement. Perhaps the most systematic 
information on governance of the cities by rebels is available from a collection consisting of 
more than a thousand documents in Persian and Urdu produced between May and September 
1857. Some of these were official messages and orders, others reports by spies, a few were 
deeds between merchants and court officers, and a few others were extracts from newspapers. 
They were preserved and catalogued for use in the trial of Bahadur Shah Zafar. In the words 
of John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Punjab and a major player in the war effort, 
these documents formed evidence of ‘the system in which the general Government was 
conducted’ including ‘the raising of loans.’16 This resource has been used, in detail for the 
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first time, in Mahmood Farooqui’s work on Delhi.17 Another work on Delhi uses English 
sources that covered some of the same subjects.18 I will draw on a printed volume in English 
describing the subject of the messages, rather than the full contents.19 This 400-page 
catalogue or ‘press-list’ as it was called does not appear to have received attention in the 
literature before. The scholarly use made of the related documents does discuss bankers, but 
does not ask the same questions that this paper asks, and therefore overlooks some of the 
information that this paper finds of particular value. 
Before ending the section, an explanation of the actors foregrounded in the essay is in 
order. The ‘merchant’ in the title refers to people who conducted and financed long-distance 
trade, and were usually based in the towns. In mutiny scholarship, the trading group that 
figures most prominently consisted of people financing cultivation and dealing with the 
peasants. There were of course some overlaps between these groups, but they were also 
distinct in institutional and social terms. The former group operated on a larger scale, issued 
bills (hundi) whereas the latter did not, its clients were other substantial traders and officers 
of the courts, and they belonged in well-known trading castes and communities whereas the 
rural groups were more mixed and included peasants. Their business was less seasonal than 
that of the rural groups, and they accepted deposits whereas the rural moneylenders rarely did 
so. The distinction, in fact, is an established one.20 The former segment is of particular 
interest to the paper, for the urban actor operated on a sufficiently large scale, had long taken 
part in fiscal administration, and was reputed enough to be seen as an ally during a war. Since 
this group financed trade, the alliance would matter to securing supplies as well as to raise 
loans. In fact, the ‘press-list’ documents mentioned above contained debt contract agreements 
between some of the bankers who figure in the present paper and members of the Mughal 
court dating back to the decades before the mutiny. Both the rebels and the British understood 
the strategic importance of the urban capitalist. In this time, the prominent urban groups came 
Mutiny and the merchants 
 
7 
 
from a few castes and communities. They were mainly Hindu Khatris in Delhi and Jain and 
Hindu trading castes from Rajasthan elsewhere. Some of them, especially Gujarati Brahmins, 
either operated from or had a base in the temple towns. Thus Mathura became a base for the 
firm of Gokuldas Parikh, former Treasurer of Gwalior state, which played a significant role in 
the counteraction against the rebels. The inheritors of the firm were Jain Oswals. 
How important was this section of the population in society? How large and how 
robust was urban trade in the decades leading up to 1857? The western and central part of the 
Gangetic plains had been relatively urbanized, and despite some decline in urban population 
in the eighteenth century, experienced a modest growth in the population of the major towns 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.21 It would be safe to assume that the traders and 
bankers of the cities were not a depressed group. Indeed, even as some of their traditional 
businesses connected to tax collection had been in decline, commodity trade in sugar, cotton, 
indigo, and grain grew if exports of these goods can be taken as benchmark. What is more, 
directly or indirectly, these trades had created scope for collaboration between overseas trade 
and overland trade, and in turn, between Europeans and Indians. Despite the end of textile 
export trade, shipping tonnage handled by Calcutta and Bombay ports increased threefold 
between 1840 and 1857 and exports exceeded imports. A significant part of the trade 
occurred in the Gangetic plains and travelled by the Indus and the Ganges towards the port 
cities. 
The rest of the essay is divided into four sections. The next section discusses the 
historiography of the episode. The mutiny scholarship has developed along a number of 
roads. More recently, innovations in sources has introduced further divisions. A new study, 
therefore, needs to start by locating itself in the diverse literature. The rest of the paper 
engages in narrative history spread over two sections. These divide the evidence into two 
blocks. One of these consists of what we know of the rebel effort to conduct warfare and 
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consolidate governments. The second one considers the evidence on the British campaign, 
focusing mainly on the north Indian war zone with only brief comments on central India (see 
map for the boundaries of the war zone). The final section concludes with a reminder of the 
main conclusion of the paper, which is that political attitudes by urban merchants and bankers 
made a difference to the outcome of the mutiny by undermining rebel attempts to run 
governments and by contributing to normal trading conditions in zones under British control. 
 
Map. Areas most affected by the mutiny, shown using 1910 district map. 
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There are four main strands within the interpretive scholarship.22 These deal with military 
strategy, representations (in colonial historiography, Indian and Victorian literary 
imagination), rebel actions and intentions, and institutional effects.23 These analyses have in 
turn led to important arguments about overt or inchoate nationalistic and anti-colonial 
discourses. 
Economics has not been overlooked. In fact, one of the first coherent accounts on the 
origin of the mutiny adopted a class struggle framework. Karl Marx was fascinated by the 
episode as much as he was in British rule in India, and suggested that the mutiny reflected 
discontent in the countryside induced by British attempts at institutional reform.24 Marx’s 
view was endorsed by Friedrich Engels. Later Marxist readings of the episode, notably by 
M.N. Roy and R. Palme Dutt observed too that the rebellion entailed a conflict between 
mercantile and landed interests. Thereafter, class analysis followed Marx to situate the 
capitalist within a narrative of the village. In a polemic against the then-prevailing views that 
the mutiny was a feudal backlash and a religious reactionary one, a Marxist-nationalist work 
of the 1960s argued that it was an uprising against ‘the commercial and industrial classes, the 
bankers and the mahajans.’25 A recent contribution reiterates that the soldier-peasant order, 
joined in some cases by the urban artisans, had suffered ‘growing economic distress and 
pauperisation’.26 
It is true that in the early stages, rural moneylenders and indigo planters were 
attacked.27 After British takeover of Awadh (1856), some of the auction purchasers of large 
landlord (talukdar) estates were mercantile in background. And they were disliked by the 
peasants, though not necessarily because of the new economic relationships that had 
emerged.28 Studies of Awadh and Bundelkhand also show that rural merchants and 
moneylenders were often targets of attack by peasants.29 Some of these later works have been 
influenced by the subaltern studies reinterpretation of Indian nationalism.  
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Can class conflict in the countryside supply a sufficient model of either the origin of 
the mutiny or of capitalist agency in its progress? I think not. First, the proposition that 
merchants were driven to joining the British because peasants resented economic exploitation 
is a constructed idea, and begs the question of merchant calculations. Military intelligence, in 
fact, revealed many cases of opportunistic attacks on merchant property by soldiers and urban 
gangs as well, as would happen in any episode of temporary breakdown of the state. Second, 
the proposition is not consistent with the proclamations made by the rebel government. None 
of these, as far as we know, mentioned exploitation of the poor by the rich, and at least one 
backed the merchants.30 Third, it lives uneasily with the diversity in peasant response. And 
fourth, the most consequential economic actors were the urban firms who had little direct 
contact with cultivation, but who did have a potential role in strengthening the fiscal 
enterprise on either side. 
The hypothesis that some groups joined the rebellion because their livelihoods had 
suffered on account of British reforms can in principle lead to the inference that livelihoods 
that did not suffer would side with the British. Eric Stokes seemed to suggest such a 
hypothesis in a discussion of the material basis of ‘magnate’ support.31 Stokes, however, left 
the point insufficiently developed, especially in relation to the urban merchants and bankers. I 
agree with the implied hypothesis that some merchants and bankers might have foreseen that 
British rule would serve their economic interests better. However, that is an incomplete story. 
In a battle zone, taking any side carried risks and threats, merchants and bankers had a lot to 
lose, and an economic history of the mutiny needs to consider these short-term risks as well 
as the expected long-term returns. 
It is necessary, therefore, to reread the evidence on capitalist experience. 
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This section gathers evidence on trader disaffection in the rebel-held regions. The larger 
picture that emerges from military intelligence gathered from the rebel-held towns is that of 
an uneasy attempt to form a coalition between the leadership and the capitalists. That 
partnership appeared to break down, because merchant property was also a target, of 
opportunistic raids by urban gangs or soldiers who had not been paid, or from suspicions of 
collaboration. 
In the middle-Gangetic plains, the most consequential battles were for the control of 
Delhi, Lucknow, and Kanpur. The battles occurred between stationary armies and had 
elements of siege warfare. These were densely populated, large, and prosperous urban 
centres, containing many markets within them, and large settlements of merchants and 
bankers. The surrounding countryside was heavily cultivated and produced much of north 
India’s grain output. The country was flat, with many good roads and good prospect of river-
borne trade. Overland trade, therefore, was large. For these reasons, supplies were initially a 
small problem for the several hundred-thousand rebel soldiers who moved into the cities. At 
least, military intelligence in May rarely mentions the issue of provision for the cities. The 
new government seized hold of government treasury. On most occasions, convicts were 
released from prison. One report suggests that the freed convicts were seen as more loyal 
transporters of goods than the population at large.32 In most parts of the Ganges-Jumna doab 
the Company’s own civil authority had crumbled away, and the landlords were, even when 
not welcoming to the rebels, not strong enough to stop or refuse supplies to soldiers. In the 
eastern districts of Awadh, the Baiswara landlords supported rebels reportedly because a 
large number of the Bengal army soldiers were Baiswara Rajputs. 
And yet, managing the resources in an organized way as well as sustaining the flow of 
revenues both posed challenge to the new governments. Little information is available 
directly on the fiscal and monetary administration of the rebel-governed cities. We do know 
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that from the start money was raised from the bankers and merchants of the cities by the 
rebels, as well as by the British, as we see later. Although such evidence is cited in the 
literature, from the usually brief citations, it is not clear what the bankers themselves thought 
of these arrangements. The documents show that  in early May, as soon as an administrative 
structure was established in the city, upon an order from the Commander-in-Chief Mirza 
Mughal the Kotwal or police chief prepared lists of merchants and bankers and estimated the 
‘subscriptions’ to be raised from them.33 In May and June, there were complaints from grain 
traders of harassment and extortion by bands of soldiers.34 Bankers did not complain, but 
they were in the spotlight throughout. On June 11, an officer of the court again raised the 
matter of subscriptions from bankers.35 On July 1, Jugal Kishor and Sheo Parshad, bankers, 
petitioned that although they paid money to the King, ‘they are subjected to the oppression of 
the Princes and the plunder of their houses and property by the sepoys.’36 On July 11, ‘the 
Mutineers demand money from the money-lenders of Delhi.’37 
A fortnight later, the King directed the Commander-in-Chief ‘to borrow money from 
the Punjabis and other wealthy people to meet war expenses.’38 On several occasions in 
August, the court summoned bankers of the city to discuss how to raise more money.39 One 
witness recalled a near-death experience in the court early in August.40 But, in fact, there 
were also attempts by the court to pacify the bankers, who had by then been subjected to 
many unauthorized demands for money by the Kotwal, by individual officers, and by 
soldiers. At least four orders were passed in August to state that only the court could deal 
with the bankers.41 Little heed, it seems, was paid to these orders. In September, crisis was 
breaking out all around. Some soldiers ‘decided to plunder the town of Delhi to realize their 
pay,’ and a few others declared their intention not to fight until paid.42 Mutineers who had not 
been paid did loot a number of shopkeepers.43 Saltpetre stocks were running out. The dealer 
Debi Das’ shop was raided by the soldiers to recover more of the article.44 ‘Respectable 
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persons at Delhi have been imprisoned as they failed to pay money to the Mutineers.’45 
Jewellery was needed for making coins, presumably some of the jewellery was seized from 
private hoards. Shops closed down for fear of raids.46 
How do we read these reports? In one interpretation, these reports suggested that the 
police was effective in making sure that the merchants and bankers did pay up.47 That leaves 
open the questions why forced extraction had to be resorted to and whether it hurt or helped 
the war. Reports on extortion confirm the general and well-founded point that the 
administrative setup created by the rebels was ‘loose and precarious’, even ‘chaotic and 
incompetent.’48 In fact, they suggest two further points explaining why the setup was 
precarious. First, the court turned towards the bankers and merchants of the city for 
accommodation because it had failed to secure a stable source of revenue from land. In turn, 
the weakness of the court exposed the capitalists to opportunistic attacks by soldiers that the 
court was unable to stop. The weakness stemmed not only from the shaky finances of the 
state, but also the fact that the rebel soldiers were divided into groups that followed their own 
commanders more than they did the writs issued by the court. 
The second point is that the merchants and bankers responded to these risks by 
various acts of passive resistance, and covert spying for the British. Of course, bankers were 
frequently mentioned in the capacity of agents or court officers. Lala Jawalanath, the most 
prominent example, is often ordered to pay for an item of expenditure by the court or by a 
band of soldiers. Such orders meant either that Jawalanath had taxation powers, perhaps he 
undertook to raise money from fellow-merchants/bankers, or that he managed a part of the 
revenues. On the other side, there was the important example of Kanhaiyya Lal Saligram, 
who had an ambiguous relationship with the court. He worked for it, but on one occasion, 
was ordered to be arrested by the court. He was not alone; but one of several bankers who hid 
themselves or refused to pay for the war. Saligram went further. Apparently unknown to the 
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rebels, he kept the British informed of the situation inside the city. In June, communiqués 
from Lala Saligram (along with Mathra Das, Jainal, and Rup Kishor of Moradabad) reached 
the British Agent in Delhi on the conditions of people (presumably merchants and bankers) 
loyal to the Company and imprisoned by the court.49 We would not be surprised if there were 
many more figures like Saligram. Indeed, another Delhi merchant Jat Mall, a witness in the 
trial of Bahadur Shah, stated that ‘the merchants and respectable tradesmen among the 
Hindus regretted [the overthrow of the British government].’50 
Likewise, several prominent merchants and bankers inside and outside Lucknow were 
willing to help the rebel government, and kept in touch with each other. We know about these 
networks from intelligence gathered by the British after they consolidated their positions in 
Benares, Mathura, Patna, Meerut, and the outskirts of Lucknow. It is not known from the 
same source in how many of these cases the rebel landlords or generals were the clients of the 
bankers who wanted to secure their interest. In June 1857, when the British had established 
authority in Meerut, efforts to raise a public loan failed because local bankers did not 
respond.51 Until the winter of 1857, Lucknow traders refused to serve the British. Bairo 
Pershad and Esree (Ishwar) Pershad, bankers of Benares, maintained a secret correspondence 
with the rebel government in Lucknow.52 They were said to be close to Madho Singh, the 
landlord of Amethi. The Patna banker Lootf Ali Khan was arrested on the suspicion of 
sheltering rebel soldiers, but released for want of proof.53 
The governments of the occupied cities held meetings with the merchants and 
bankers, though few details are available on how the future role for the capitalists in the new 
governments was seen. Nana Saheb’s war council in Kanpur did not include the wealthy 
merchants and bankers, but was willing to listen to them. For example, on June 10, 1857, ‘the 
city mohajuns .. and influential men, such as Shew Pershaud, the present treasurer; Gunga 
Pershaud, tent-maker; Jogul Kishore, Jeweller; and Biddee, Pawn seller’ could have their 
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favourite city police chief Hoolas Singh reappointed to his post after he had been initially 
suspended.54 
Suspicions of collaboration disturbed these efforts to create a common platform. 
Nowhere was this more obvious than in Kanpur. In Kanpur, potential suspects included a 
large segment of the middle class. Far more than Delhi or Lucknow, Kanpur was an Indo-
European city. Its prominence had owed to military camp, administrative offices, and long-
distance trade in sugar and indigo. Few of the indigenous bankers, merchants, and Bengali 
‘writers’ or clerks settled in the city felt compelled to join the Europeans sheltered in an 
entrenchment. But many amongst them ‘received much annoyance from the mutineers’, were 
imprisoned, and had to ‘hide themselves to save their lives’.55 Proven cases of transaction 
with the European entrenchment were dealt with death.56 
By June 1857, military intelligence was rife with reports of tensions inside Kanpur. A 
large part of the seized government treasure had leaked out. The use made of the contents 
suggests that these acquisitions were not used to strengthen the fiscal enterprise. For example, 
a vast quantity of stamp paper seized in Allahabad turned up in underground markets in 
Bengal and Bihar months later, on one occasion sold by sailors employed by river steamers.57 
The governance of Kanpur effectively passed on from Nana Saheb to the soldiers. ‘The 
mutineers, being in want of saltpetre confined Juggunnath, seller of that article, in order to 
extort the requisite supply’.58 The soldiers operating the batteries outside the besieged 
European entrenchment plundered ‘supplies brought in, .. helping themselves to large 
quantities of sugar ..’59 When reports of an imminent British attack reached the city in July, it 
proved difficult for the war council to procure carriage and supplies.60 
In or near Kanpur, merchants secretly supplied intelligence and protection to the 
Company and its allies. In July, in Kalpi, a cloth merchant Ganesh was caught trying to 
protect a party of Europeans.61 In June, the merchants of Kanpur sent out intelligence to the 
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British garrisons about conditions of the besieged European population. ‘A Native merchant’s 
letter from Cawnpore’ brought to light, very usefully for the British, the discord between 
Nana Saheb and the soldiers, which at one point threatened his life.62 That many rebel 
soldiers saw themselves as mercenaries made these disputes difficult to resolve.63  
If Kanpur, Delhi, and Lucknow had rebel governments, and therefore a prospect of 
negotiation between the state and business interests, in other cities of the Gangetic plains the 
authority of any party was weak.64 From these places, numerous reports of attacks on 
merchant property began to come in. On the night of May 10, urban gangs raided merchant 
homes in Meerut.65 These raids turned into small-scale battles because the merchants had 
private armies. In Banda town in the month of June, the merchant armies succeeded in 
driving off the raiders.66 In Azamgarh town in June 1857, ‘large sums of money were 
extorted by violence or threats of it from the merchants and bankers of the city.’67 On the 
news of the outbreak in Meerut, parties made up of locals of Budaun started off, and ‘black-
mail .. was freely levied by the rioters from all the bunniyahs and muhajans in their 
neighbourhood.’68 In May 1857, rebel soldiers attacked in Moradabad the home of a ‘wealthy 
bunneah’, and tortured one member of the family.69 In September 1857, when British troops 
entered Hazaribagh, they found the bazaar plundered.70 ‘The little band of rebels traversing 
Mirzapoor’ took their supplies by force.71 As late as March 1858, attacks on merchants were 
reported from villages in the Doab, but who the attackers were it was not known.72 
Some of these attacks on merchant property took the form of attempts at taxation, 
authorized or not, and some were attempts to punish collaborators. In August 1857 a minister 
(nazim) of the king of Lucknow occupied Gorakhpur town and ‘forcibly exacted large sums 
of money from the merchants of the city.’73 In October 1857, a rebel general Niaz Mahomed 
Khan ‘levied fines’ from merchants in Sahaswan.74 In Tirhoot, the army of Kooar Singh of 
Jagdishpur caused great anxiety to the town merchants. Letters intercepted south of the 
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Jumna in November 1857 revealed evidence of enquiries being made by the rebels on which 
merchants traded with the English.75 In Moradabad, a tense moment occurred in April 1858 
when a commander of Rohilkhand rebels arrived and ‘demanded money and supplies’. The 
course of the war was already decided and it was not surprising that ‘the townspeople refused 
.. whereupon the prince, after some negotiation, endeavoured to help himself by force’.76 
 In the early days of the outbreak in Punjab there were episodes of seizure of 
mercantile property. Grain was taken by force from shops in Ludhiana, and ‘wherever a horse 
or mule could be found, the rebel hand was laid instantly upon it’.77 The bankers were 
reported to have quietly transferred their money chests and the merchants locked up shops. In 
Jullunder, the mutineers caused little damage except for ‘an occasional .. demand for money, 
[and] carrying off flour and grain from the bunniahs’ shops.’78 
In Rajputana and Mewat, ‘the air was infected with panic’.79 Containing important 
overland trade routes and settlements of merchants and bankers, and yet, poorly defended, 
Rajputana was particularly exposed to attacks, on these occasions, not by rebel generals but 
semi-nomadic groups. In July 1857, armed Gujar troops moved about Mewat. The most 
notorious in British records was Deohans, who attacked Dholepur town. Among his 
casualties were three town merchants. The merchants sought protection from one Buham, 
who was killed in an encounter with Deohans on 14th July.80 In ‘the great centres’ of trade in 
Rajputana, bankers sent away their families in June 1857 and sent petitions to the Governor 
General seeking ‘advice and protection’. In Mewat itself, the Gujar attackers were in some 
cases inspired by the prospect of targeting their creditors and destroying account books.81 
Some of the raids conducted in September-October were more related to the high 
price of food in that season.82 The kharif (autumn) harvest of 1857 was good, but prices of 
grain were higher than usual on account of disruption of supplies.83 In the Rohilkhand plains, 
the stationary battles had been over by December with the fall of Lucknow, giving way, in 
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winter and spring of 1858, to small-scale encounters between mobile armies. These episodes 
were frequent enough to exhaust the countryside of supplies and both parties faced 
difficulties in procuring food. When food ran scarce in the bazaars, traders’ choices mattered 
more crucially. Months before in the market towns of Rajputana, British troops failed to 
procure any supplies in June until the news of the battle at Badli-ke-Sarai (June 8) reached 
the towns, and the supply situation reversed dramatically.84 The same thing happened in 
Awadh in winter. Victory in Lucknow and against the Gwalior Contingent changed merchant 
attitudes in the heart of the war zone dramatically. On the British side, punitive raids on 
minor landlords suspected of helping the rebels targeted food. ‘We took all the grain we 
could find, and burnt the village’ was a refrain that was to be repeated again and again in the 
autumn of 1857.85 By then, the Awadh landlords had turned against the British out of 
desperation.86 
But raids on food stocks did not constitute the most effective strategy of the British 
campaign. Rather it was building links with private trade along the two great arteries of cargo 
movement, the Indus and the Ganges. 
 
III 
This section gathers evidence on two things that mattered to British war effort, protection and 
financial help extended by merchants in conflict zones, and keeping long-distance trade 
routes safe, well-stocked, and running. The second strategy could not possibly succeed 
without Indian traders choosing to help the Commissariat department. This was so because 
the Company state neither had the administrative means nor the intention to follow what 
modern states often did in periods of conflict, directly regulate markets. 
‘An army in India’, wrote one veteran of the Anglo-Punjab wars, ‘is followed by 
another army whose general or commander-in-chief is the bazaar kotwal.’87 Shortly after the 
Mutiny and the merchants 
 
19 
 
fall of Delhi on 11th May 1857, the troops that moved from Punjab to the outskirts of the city 
functioned in a two-tiered setup of this kind. Many members of the rear were artisans and 
service workers, ‘barbers, cooks, shoeblacks, and so forth’, and a large number of bheesties 
or water carriers. The elderly members of the group recalled the Afghan wars of 1840-2.88 
The bazaar kotwal supervised the procurement of food. In the eighteenth century, supplies 
were managed mainly by dealing with the bullock convoys that transported grain, and camp 
followers who supplied artisanal services and sometimes managed the procurement of grain 
on the way. 
Early in the crisis, as the downfall of the Company regime seemed a certainty, ‘the 
camp followers, so necessary to the efficiency of an army in India, deserted like rats from a 
sinking ship.’89 Indeed, camp-followers subsequently received scant mention in mutiny 
sources. In one rare instance, the ancient system was revived. In February 1858, Major (later 
Major-General) John Coke stationed near Moradabad enlisted the help of the mobile caravan-
runners or Banjara headmen who had been grazing their cattle in the Terai.90 But contracting 
with caravan-runners was not the norm. 
This is not surprising. In 1857, the Company army fought a different form of warfare 
than those it had engaged in before. It had never fought battles on such large scale in the 
Ganges-Jumna plains before. Its forces were larger on average than in the eighteenth century. 
And it was trying to retake cities under enemy occupation, which operation took time. These 
circumstances made supplies a crucial problem, and made it necessary to procure supplies by 
bureaucratic means, that is, rely on revenue and trade. 
Needless to say, the Company regime received unqualified expression of loyalty from 
the non-official European and Eurasians during the campaign. But if the non-official 
European was useful as military volunteers they rarely had a chance to contribute in their 
traditional roles as traders, artisans and planters. Except in Kanpur, their knowledge of 
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overland and domestic trade was not useful. Few had experience of trading in grain and 
saltpetre, the two vital resources. Most had conducted businesses within the European 
quarters, were small in number, and with few exceptions, fugitives, killed or besieged. 
The British authorities believed that the Indian merchants owed their wealth to the 
Raj, and would naturally come to its aid. ‘If there was any body of men in India who ought to 
have come forward to help us in difficulty it was ‘the monied interest’’.91 There was an 
element of truth in this assertion. Some merchants and bankers were mobile and had more 
information about the course of events on a larger scale. For example, in Assam and Rangpur, 
the Marwari merchants made statements in public that ‘as every one must know .. who, like 
us, has travelled’, the scale of reinforcement from Calcutta was too large for the rebellion to 
withstand.92 In Meerut and Peshawar, the British acted on their belief and called upon the 
merchants in May and June to subscribe to war loans. The response was lukewarm in Meerut, 
as we have seen. It was generous in Punjab, but not before arm-twisting had been resorted 
to.93 A show of neutrality was not only the politically safer option for the merchants, but also 
made economic sense since government paper was rapidly losing value. In Awadh and 
Rohilkhand the confidence that merchants would voluntarily risk their lives for the British 
disappeared quickly. 
Still, collaborations were present on a noticeable scale. In the early months of the 
mutiny, taking the side of the British anywhere in the middle Gangetic plains would have 
carried grave risks. Many firms, however, did so. The banking firms Lakhsmi Chand Jain of 
Mathura and Manik Chand of Allahabad are prominent examples.94 Mathura was an 
important centre of finance in north India. Lakshmi Chand with his brothers Radha Krishan 
and Gobind Das sent the first pieces of intelligence to the revenue officer at Agra of a 
restlessness in the army, which led to a disarming of the infantry troops in Agra. The city was 
not seriously threatened thereafter. Upon the approach of the Nimach brigade in August 1857 
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- a rebel force commanded by Bakht Khan sent from Delhi to attack the rear of the British 
forces besieging Delhi - the brothers provided shelter to fugitive European families, 
transported them safely to Agra, kept the flow of intelligence intact, and during the months 
when the banking system in northern India had collapsed completely, made loans to the 
administration.95 They could offer some of these services because the bankers commanded 
armies, and believed credibly that they could meet small-scale threats on their own. There 
were similar stories from Rajputana and Punjab. The Marwari banker of Bikaner, Bansi Lal 
Daga, started buying up Company government security that sold at one-quarter of the face 
value in May 1857, ending up exceedingly rich seven months later. In order to defend his 
investment, he ‘identified himself so thoroughly with the cause of the Government as to 
undertake large contracts for the supply of food for the troops in the field, and freely 
advanced money on supply lines drawn on other parts of the country, disorganized as it 
was.’96 
The control of Agra Fort in July 1857 led to the establishment of a market inside the 
garrison compound. Artisans and shopkeepers came inside the fort. The same thing happened 
inside Saugor Fort later. On the matter of supplying food to the Agra Fort, ‘the cares of the 
Commissariat Department .. were greatly lightened by the influence exerted by .. Lala Joti 
Parshad, a contractor whose successful provisionment of the army during the Afghan, the 
Sikh, and the Gwaliar wars had gained him a great and deserved reputation.’97 In Dehra Dun, 
‘food was procured through local merchants.’98 In August, the government urged Jyoti Prasad 
to supervise the running of regular horse vans from Agra southward for the carriage of 
supplies.99 
Colonel R. Baird Smith’s report from Roorkee on the Ganges Canal stated that the 
first intelligence on the prospect of a mutiny came from the merchants engaged in grain trade 
for the military bazaar at Fatehgarh.100 They were also grain millers, and were implicitly 
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accused of mixing bone-dust with the flour. The scale in which the rumour circulated alarmed 
them. The merchants, however, continued making investments, which led Baird Smith to 
suspect that ‘although .. conscious of the general feeling of .. alienation .. the actual outburst 
of the mutiny took their class almost as much by surprise as it did ourselves.’101 
Despite these instances, the mention of specific firms, individuals or groups of traders 
remained rare in military intelligence. Far more space is devoted to the project of reviving 
trade on the western and eastern sides of the war zone. The two strategic supply routes the 
British could hope to hold on to was the Punjab segment of the Grand Trunk Road, between 
Jumna and Sutlej, in turn connecting via the Sutlej-Indus river-borne trade with Bombay and 
Aden, and the Ganges river traffic linking north India with Calcutta. After Punjab came back 
in British control, the collaboration between the merchants and the small army that laid siege 
in Delhi without immediate hope of a re-conquest proved of crucial help. After Delhi was 
recaptured on September 14, the report prepared by the commanding officer in the battles for 
Delhi, General Archdale Wilson, separately acknowledged two initiatives on keeping the 
Company army well-stocked. One of these was the office of the Commissary General, and 
the other was the contribution of the rulers of the Punjab states, Patiala, Kapurthala, Nabha, 
Maler Kotla, and Jind in protecting trade routes, and supplying carriages and cargo.102 The 
states themselves did not procure the goods, the merchants did, but they protected their 
property. ‘The great thoroughfare [Punjab-Delhi] was soon alive with carts and carriages and 
beasts of burden conveying downwards all that was most needed by the Army’.103 On the 
western side, cargo boats came up to Ferozepur on the Sutlej from Karachi, and they carried 
freight from Aden and Bombay. These were crucial services, and explained why the 
managers of the Delhi campaign, such as the Military Secretary General Archibald Alison, 
never had to seriously worry about food or other necessities of life. 
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With the trade routes and commercial intelligence in their hands, the British in Punjab 
could restrict the sale of sulphur, saltpetre, and lead, and starve Delhi of these materials.104 
Hundreds of artisans were gathered in Ferozepur, well away from the reach of the rebels. The 
town was turned into a major manufacturing centre for tent cloth.105 How much of a 
difference the hold on sulphur and saltpetre made had been demonstrated on the 7th of 
August. Several hundred artisans in Delhi had been pressed to work on manufacture of 
gunpowder in Begum Samroo’s house. On the 7th of August, a shell destroyed this factory 
and storage, along with the lives of five hundred or more artisans.106 It is not surprising then 
that this one attack was celebrated as a huge strategic victory by the British camp. 
If in Punjab, the Cis-Sutlej rulers protected trade routes, in the Ganges between 
Calcutta and Allahabad, the Company picketed the river, if not very effectively. Despite 
uprising in Danapur (25th July), there never was a decisive attempt by the rebel commanders 
to stop supplies up the river. River steamers were used for movement of commanders and 
reconnaissance missions by the British, to bring wounded soldiers and their families to 
Calcutta, and for cargo. In August 1857, baggage boats organized by merchants travelled 
along the Jumna, to reach supplies to units operating in the strategic grounds of the doab.107 
A rare Indian eyewitness account of the cargo boats was left by the Bengali litterateur and 
religious reformer Debendranath Tagore, who travelled from Allahabad to Calcutta by a 
military cargo-cum-passenger boat in October 1857.108 These boats were targeted from the 
land, and were often stranded for fear of attacks.109 But the rivers continued to be used by the 
troops and the traders. 
The procurement effort was coordinated by offices newly established or much 
enhanced in power. In August, a special office called Superintendent of carriage and supplies 
was established. The Commissariat in Bengal was issuing numerous indents and contracts for 
procurement of food, coal, sulphur and saltpetre, and cloth.110 The correspondence of these 
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departments suggests that the task of market purchase and transportation of supplies could be 
coordinated better after the August reorganization. At any rate, procuring materiel from the 
market was thereafter as big a subject of discussion as troop movement and battle strategy.111 
Although neither Bombay nor Calcutta was a battlefront, both played a critical role in 
supplies. In June 1857, the new commander of the Bengal Army, Patrick Grant, transferred 
the command of the field to Henry Havelock, citing the necessity to stay back and manage 
supplies from Calcutta.112 In later months, ‘Calcutta deserves notice as the .. depot of stores 
and supplies.’113 Bombay, likewise, was far from the action but served Punjab. Jabalpur and 
Saugor, two large market towns, similarly served the central Indian front in 1858. In turn, the 
overland route between Bombay and Jabalpur played a role similar in importance to that of 
the Grant Trunk Road up north.114 
In Bombay and Calcutta merchants and bankers needed no pressure to back the 
Company regime. In Calcutta, when the first stirrings of mutiny occurred among the 19th and 
34th ‘native infantry’ in March-June 1857, and especially after the fall of Delhi, sections of 
the Bengali press was said to have expressed sympathies for the rebels. The matter was 
quietly overlooked by the authorities. The divergence in tone between the Bengali and the 
English press soon disappeared. After all, ‘as traders, the interests of the European and of the 
native merchants were identical.’115 
In September 1857, led by the Maharaja of Burdwan and leading members of the 
Sovabajar estate, Radhakanta Deb and Kalikrishna Deb, more than 2,500 prominent Indian 
citizens of Calcutta signed on an address congratulating the Viceroy on the recapture of 
Delhi.116 The signatories, in their own testimony, included ‘merchants and trademen’. This 
message was followed by another submitted a few months later and signed by more than 
5,000 individuals; again many of the signatories were merchants. The addresses were not just 
expressions of loyalty; they also expressed anxiety over private property and lives of 
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expatirate Bengalis. The Bengali press of the time lamented ‘the disorganization caused by 
[the] mutiny.’117 
In Bombay and Surat, the mutiny brought in its wake a panic among the mercantile 
community. Order was restored when the only potentially serious episode among an infantry 
regiment was crushed brutally by the police chief Charles Forjett. When Forjett retired from 
service, he was honoured by ‘the native cotton merchants’ with a purse of fifteen hundred 
pounds and shares in a cotton mill worth thirteen thousand more.118 Christopher Birdwood 
was also honoured by Bombay merchants; his contribution was to organize, as the chief 
officer of the commissariat, bullock trains between Bombay, Vasind, and Mhow, on which 
the success of Huge Rose’s central India operations depended.119 In Surat, a trading town, a 
panic broke out in the middle of 1858, when Tatya Tope was reported to be planning an 
attack on the city. The merchant-landlord Syad Hossan-Al Edrus offered to join the campaign 
against Tope.120 
With the trade infrastructure in place, markets revived during winter. In the relatively 
peaceful Champaran, European indigo planters had carried on their business as usual, if 
inconvenienced by the refusal of cash advances by indigenous bankers. Money, in fact, was 
scarce between May and August, because of the collapse of the remittance and bills business. 
In Monghyr, bankers refused to issue drafts.121 But by September, in Bihar, ‘trade was 
reviving .. and money-orders were procurable.’122 As the British consolidated command over 
the two river-borne channels of transportation and trade, it was only rebel-held Awadh in the 
middle that remained cut off from trade and normal flow of funds. 
Re-conquest caused a backlash against merchants who had remained in rebel-held 
cities, or they were simply targets of a further round of looting. An October 1857 despatch 
from Muzaffarpur reported that the Company’s Indian soldiers were intimidating the 
shopkeepers into selling food at lower than market prices.123 There were similar complaints 
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from Patna. In Delhi there was extensive looting that targeted the merchants. A captain of the 
61st Regiment that recaptured Delhi delightedly recalled how he and a colleague, after several 
days of unsuccessful raids, came upon a huge store of gold brocade in a secret vault of a 
merchant home that was seemingly abandoned.124  
But there was also a growing anxiety about merchant disaffection, possibly fed by the 
feeling that private trade had been a crucial strategic ally. Thus, even when soldiers went out 
of control, the administration went the other way. Upon regaining full control of Awadh cities 
in January 1858, the administration issued a number of proclamations aimed to reassure 
merchants that procurements would be paid for.125 The pacification process turned out to be 
more tortuous in Lucknow. The loyalty of the merchants being more in question in Lucknow, 
the oppression and extortion of the marauding Company army was especially severe here. 
‘They were pacified by the personal interest displayed by the new Chief Commissioner in 
their welfare and by the practical measures he took .. to put a stop to the seizures and 
demolition of houses in the city, which had formed one staple of their grievances.’126 
After November 1857, the axis of the mutiny shifted towards central India, where 
Tatya Tope commanded an alliance. It is sufficient here to add only a short note on central 
India. The important distinction of the region was its economic geography. Bundelkhand and 
Malwa consisted mainly of forested uplands that did not have densely cultivated tracts 
outside the Narmada river valley. There were few towns comparable in size with those of 
northern India. Transportation arteries were smaller in capacity. The engagements involved 
mobile armies, which made supplies en-route of critical importance. The British Indian army 
and the rebels both needed to enlist the support of the princely states. 
As things turned out, except Jhansi, most states in central India remained loyal to the 
British, though often paralyzed by divided loyalty within the court. The uncertainty was 
intense with Rewa, which faced a revolt in October. A number of Bundelkhand chiefs had let 
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it be known that if Rewa joined the rebels they would do too. The great value of this buffer 
was that ‘daily at least 200 bullocks laden with grain pass through’ this area.127 Elsewhere, 
alliances between local troops and rebels induced the rulers to open up supply lines to the 
latter. This was the situation with the Holkar when the residency in Indore was attacked on 
the 1st of July.128 It happened again after Tope captured Charkhari in December, and Gwalior 
in May 1858 after a nominal battle. The Gwalior finance minister handed over the treasury to 
the combined rebel army. Thereafter, the central Indian campaign effectively ended. The 
depleted army of Tope moved in territories south of the Narmada, occasionally raiding 
merchant caravans, and facing resistance from merchants and peasants elsewhere.129 Several 
reports of opportunistic raids on merchant convoys came to light in 1860 when Bombay’s 
opium merchants petitioned for compensation. It transpired that for some time in 1858 and 
1859, opium trains had also received protection from armed escorts supplied by the state.130 
 
IV 
This essay suggests that urban capitalists shaped the course of the rebellion of 1857, and 
shows some of the ways they did. It proposes two types of revision of the economic history of 
the mutiny. First, it is necessary to extend the economic history beyond the peasant-
moneylender narrative that the literature has been familiar with, and include large-scale 
business enterprise of the cities. Second, political decisions by merchants and bankers in the 
war cannot be understood in terms of blind loyalty or fear. Merchants in the war zone were at 
risk, and took great risk in making political decisions. Capitalist attitudes were shaped by 
attacks on private property and by the fraught relationship that developed between the rebel 
soldiers, rebel governments and the wealthy townsmen. The rebels’ fiscal basis was confined 
to the economies of a few cities. Increasingly cut off from trade and revenue flows, the war 
effort within the cities turned extortionate on the resident merchants, some amongst whom 
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secretly helped the Company’s military effort. Outside the war zone, military control of the 
riparian trade highways gave the British access not only to the ports, but also to food, 
saltpetre, and carriages from friendlier traders located in the interior. Their war effort 
succeeded because trade and procurement joined forces. 
These propositions lead, not just to a story of capitalists collaborating with the empire, 
though it is a known fact – and an under-explored one – that the urban merchants saw the 
empire in a different light from the peasants and landlords. Moreover, these propositions 
illustrate a fundamental insight from the global economic history of warfare, namely, large 
and sustained conflicts alter risks and returns, and therefore cannot be understood other than 
as a chapter in economic and business history. 
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